GEORGIA'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: ARE LIMITATIONS ON
DEATH BENEFITS TO FOREIGN, NONRESIDENT DEPENDENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL? BARGE-WAGENER CONSTR. Co. V. MORALES

I. FACTS
Jose Antonio Morales, age 31, was employed by Barge-Wagener

Construction Company and worked at a construction site in Atlanta,
Georgia.2 Morales, a Mexican citizen, was a legal resident of the United
States and was employed under a valid work visa.3 His wife, Julia, and his
two young sons, Juan and Daniel, were citizens and residents of Mexico.4
Morales earned an average weekly salary of $450, before United States and
Georgia income taxes,5 which he used to support his family in Mexico.6
On September 19, 1990, Morales fell twenty-two stories to his death when
a scaffold at a construction site gave way.7 In accordance with Georgia's
Workers' Compensation Statute,' Barge-Wagner and its insurer, the

Argonaut Insurance Company, were required to provide up to $5,000 for
Morales' burial costs. 9

However, the Georgia statute permits a maximum payment of $1,000 as
compensation to the dependents of a deceased employee if the dependents
are not citizens or residents of the United States or Canada. 0 Thus, Barge'429 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993).
2 Bill Rankin, Court Endorses $1,000 Limit on Death Benefit Restriction on Foreigners;

Called
Discriminatorybut Legal, ATLANTA CONST., May 29, 1993, at B 1.
3
4

id.

1d.

5 Jose A. Morales, State Bd. of Workers' Comp., State of Georgia, Cl. No. 451-93-5853
(March 13, 1992) [hereinafter Order of the A.L.J.].
6 Rankin, supra note 2, at B 1.
7 Katie Wood, Comp Law Discriminates,But That's OK, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
May 27, 1993, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Comp Law Discriminates].

'GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-265 (1993).
9 Id. See infra note 10.
10GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-265(b)(5) (1993). The statute provides:

(b) If death results instantly from an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment or if during the period of disability caused by an
accident death results proximately therefrom, the compensation under this
chapter shall [include] ...

(1) ...

the reasonable expenses of the

employees' last sickness and burial expenses not to exceed $5,000.00
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Wagener and its insurer paid only $1,000 to the surviving Morales family.
Had the Morales dependents been citizens or residents of the United States
or Canada, they would have received up to $100,000 for their loss." This
amount would include weekly benefits for Mrs. Morales until age 65, and for
Juan and Daniel until they reached age 18 or graduated from high school or
college.' 2 Incredibly, if Morales' family had violated the United States
immigiation laws and illegally resided with him in this country at the time
of his death, they would have received the full protection and benefit of the
Georgia Workers' Compensation statute. 3

(5) If the employee leaves dependents who are not citizens or
residents of the United States or the Dominion of Canada at the time of
the accident, the amount of compensation shall not in any case exceed
$1,000.00.
Id.
The statute was originally enacted in 1920. See 1920 Ga. Laws, 187-88, § 38. At that
time, the maximum benefit for burial expenses was $100, and the minimum dependency
benefit for United States and Canadian citizens and residents was $10 a week for 300 weeks,
or a total of $3,000. This amount has since increased to $100,000. See GA. CODE ANN. §
34-9-265(d) (1993). However, the benefit to non-Canadian, nonresident families of alien
workers killed on the job has remained the same since 1920: $1,000. Id. Since Georgia
does not maintain a legislative history for its statutes, no justification is available for the
legislature's decision to set this discriminatory limit on death benefits payable to non-resident
alien decedents. Nor has any rationale been given for the exemption of aliens who are
citizens or residents of Canada. See Brief for Petitioner at 18, Morales v. Barge-Wagener
Constr. Co., 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993) (No. 93-432) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
" GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-265(b)(2) (1993). Georgia Code section 34-9-261, which sets
out compensation for total disability, provides that upon death
the employer shall pay ... to the employee a weekly benefit equal to
two-thirds of the employee's average weekly wage but not more than
$250.00 per week nor less than $25.00 per week ....
The weekly
benefit under this Code section shall be payable for a maximum period
of 400 weeks.
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-261 (1993).
12 Court OKs Georgia Cap on Alien Death Benefits, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 30, 1993,
at Al [hereinafter Court OKs Georgia Cap.].
"3Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 18. See also De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau
Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 207 (Fla. 1989) (construing a statute similar to Georgia's,
the Florida Supreme Court found that a "benefit that is unavailable to [nonresident) petitioners
[would be] ... available to [foreign] workers [who] ... are in this country illegally"); cf.
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution was designed to protect all within the boundaries of a State, including aliens
unlawfully present).
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The Morales family hired local counsel and challenged the restrictive
statute, but lost the case before the Georgia State Board of Workers'
Compensation. 4 The decision was overturned on appeal to the Fulton
County Superior Court, where the Court held that the statute violated the
equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitution. 5 On May 24, 1993,
the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision,
upholding the Board of Workers' Compensation ruling.'6 On November
14Order of the A.L.J., supra note 5, at 25A. At the Board Hearing, the Morales family

claimed that Georgia Code section 34-9-265(b)(5) violated their equal protection rights under
both the Georgia and U.S. Constitutions. The Administrative Law Judge clearly supported
the Morales' position, holding in his opinion that he felt they would eventually prevail since
there was "no apparent rational basis for the legislature to distinguish between citizens of
Canada and citizens of any other country that might be working in the United States." Id.
However, since the board did not have the authority to declare a statute unconstitutional, the
judge was forced to award the Morales family the sum of $1,000 in accordance with § 34-9265. Id.
" Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671, 672 (Ga. 1993). The Georgia
Constitution provides, "[N]o person shall be denied equal protection of the laws." GA.
CONST. art I, § 1, 1 1. In reversing the Board decision, the Superior Court held that alienage
is a suspect classification and that the respective statutes discriminated based upon alienage.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 14A. Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the
Superior Court held that the statute infringed too greatly upon fundamental rights granted by
the Georgia Constitution, and held the statute unconstitutional. The court did not find it
necessary
to reach the merits of the Morales family's claim under the U.S. Constitution. Id.
6
1 Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 429 S.E.2d at 674. The Court found Georgia's Workers'
Compensation Statute constitutional, holding that the protections of the Georgia and U.S.
Constitutions do not extend to non-resident foreigners. Id. at 673. "[While the statute] surely
discriminates against Mr. Morales' family in Mexico.... it is not unlawful." 1d. The Court
focused on two issues: first, whether the rights of the decedent or his non-resident dependents
in Mexico were at stake; and secondly, whether Georgia's statute violated the pertinent party's
rights under the Georgia Constitution. Id. at 672. In reaching its conclusion that the payment
of death benefits affected no right of the decedent, the Court distinguished between burial
benefits, which belonged to the decedent's estate, and death benefits, which belonged to the
beneficiaries. Id. The Court stated
The death benefits are intended to compensate the beneficiaries for their
injury, which is the loss of support resulting from the death of the
deceased worker. This is not merely the survival of the rights of the
deceased; the rights to death benefits do not accrue until the death of the
worker.
Id. Further, the Court found that the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution does not
extend to nonresident aliens. This holding is based on a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In Johnson, the Court distinguished between
aliens residing within the jurisdiction of the United States, and those residing outside U.S.
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29, 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, allowing
17
the Georgia statute and the Board ruling in the Morales case to stand.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Workers' compensation statutes of many other states have discriminatory
classification schemes similar to the Georgia provision, albeit to varying

degrees."

Recent court decisions construing these statutes have focused

primarily on whether the benefits vest in the decedent or the surviving

family, and then on the constitutionality of any limitation on benefits.' 9
There has been little support for the distinction between Canadian and all

other nonresidents that is often found in these statutes. 20

boundaries, stating that "it is an alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gives
the Judiciary the power to act." Johnson, 339 U.S. at 770-71.
" Morales v. Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993). See also Court OKs
Georgia Cap, supra note 12, at Al.
"8Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 7, 17. For a comparison of the Georgia statute
to the statutes of other states, see Rankin, supra note 2, at B 1 (citing Brief for Appellee,
Morales v. Barge-Wagener Construction Co., 429 S.E. 2d 671 (Ga. 1993)). Thirty-seven
states make no distinction between dependents residing in the United States and those not
residing in the United States; four states reduce death benefits to all nonresident dependents
(of these four states, two reduce the benefit to 50%, one state reduces the benefit to 60%, and
one reduces the death benefit to $750.00); six states provide the same benefits to nonresident,
non-Canadian dependents but allow insurers to pay in a lump sum discounting between 4%
and up to sometimes 50% for illegible interest; and two states provide 50% of the normal
death benefits to nonresident, non-Canadian dependents. Id.
9 See Alvarez Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416 (Utah 1986); De Ayala v.
Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989); Jalifi v. Indus. Comm'n,
644 P.2d 1319 (Ariz. App. 1982); Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993);
Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Const., Inc., 607 P.2d 597 (N.M. 1980). Since there is currently no
treaty with Mexico extending the same workers' compensation rights of U.S. citizens to
Mexican nationals, no Supremacy Clause issue exists. See ARTHMR LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAw, § 63.50, n.36 (1994).
20 It has been suggested that the United States and Canada have traditionally shared a
unique relationship, both economically and politically, that is unlike that shared with any
other foreign nation. Brief for Respondent, Morales v. Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 114 S.
Ct. 579 (1993) (No. 93-432) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. However, this view has been
vigorously rejected in some jurisdictions. See De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 207 ("What possible
state purpose would justify giving a benefit to nonresident Canadians that it denied Mexicans?
...[this Court] can discern no rational basis for the distinction drawn between the northern
border and the southern one by this statute").
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A. General Policy
The workers' compensation system is based on an exchange: an employee
gives up the right to sue an employer for workplace injuries in exchange for
assured benefits.2 The purpose of these benefits is social in nature; they
exist in order to provide support and prevent poverty for injured employees
Based upon the social aspect of these benefits,
and their dependents.'
workers' compensation statutes have generally been liberally interpreted in
Liberal
order to give the employee the greatest possible protection.'
the
financial
goal
of
removing
overall
interpretation is consistent with the
burden of workplace injury and disability from employees and ultimately
placing these costs upon industries and consumers.'
Additionally, ease of administration of employees' benefits has been a
consideration. Workers' compensation statutes with an overall pattern of
discrimination towards nonresident aliens have been justified not due to "any
desire to discriminate but... [due to] the awkward problem of proof and
continuing administration that is unavoidably present in these cases."'
B. Vesting of Death Benefit Rights
1. Rights of Surviving Dependents
Death benefits under workers' compensation statutes have generally been
held to belong to the surviving dependents and not to the deceased.' As
21LARSON supra note 19, at § 1.10.
2 Id. at § 1.20.
' See Int'l Mercantile Marine Co. v. Lowe, 93 F.2d 663, 665 (2nd Cir. 1938).
24 i See LARSON, supra note 19, at § 1.00.
"' LARSON, supra note 19, at § 63.50. See also Catelli v. Bayonne Assoc., 3 N.J. Super.
122, 65 A.2d 617 (1949). In that case, the decedent's mother in Italy claimed dependency,
and the court was forced to send the case back for additional findings which involved facts
that had to be investigated in Italy. These facts included the monthly living costs of the
mother, the value of support provided to the mother by her daughter, and the value of the lira
at certain relevant times. LARSON, supra note 19, at § 63.50, n.35. But see Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) ("there can be no doubt that 'administrative convenience'
is not a mere shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality").
26 LARSON, supra note 19, at § 64.00. This section provides:
The dependent's right to death benefits is an independent right derived
from statute, not from the rights of the decedent. Accordingly, death
benefits are not affected by compromises or releases executed by

402

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 24:397

such, many court decisions have held that rights to such benefits must be
asserted by the surviving dependents, not by the deceased. 27 However,
these leading cases, construing the death benefit as a property right of the
surviving dependents, have for the most part resulted in a more favorable
benefit for these dependents, not a reduction or strict limitation.'
Such was the result in InternationalMercantile Marine Co. v. Lowe, 93
F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1938). There, an injured longshoreman, who was paid
compensation totaling $6,375 for a period of over seven years following his
job-related injuries, eventually died as a result of those injuries. His wife
sought a death benefit, in accordance with statute, of $10.50 a week up to
a maximum of $7,500. The employer sought to limit the entire benefit paid
to both the longshoreman and his widow to $7,500. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit definitively held that the "amount to which
the widow or next of kin is entitled is for their exclusive benefit and is
entirely separate and distinct from the compensation for disability allowed
the employee." 29
However, separating the death benefit from the decedent's rights was
clearly intended to gain the most favorable benefit paid to the surviving
wife. 30 Such a beneficial result for the survivors also exists in other cases

decedent, or by an adverse holding on decedent's claim, or by claimant's
failure to claim within the statutory period.
Id. See Int'l Mercantile Marine Co., 93 F.2d at 664 (according to the Court of Appeals,
"[T]he amount to which the widow or next of kin is entitled is for their exclusive benefit and
is entirely separate and distinct from the compensation for disability allowed the employee.")
27See Int'l Mercantile Marine Co., 93 F.2d at 663 (1938); Madera Sugar Pine Co. v.
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499 (1923); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 485
N.E.2d 335 (11. 1985); Sizemore v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 219 S.E.2d 912
(W. Va. 1975); Rosander v. Copco Steel & Eng'g Co., 429 N.E.2d 990 (Ind.App. 1982).
2 See infra note 31.
9 Int'l Mercantile Marine Co., 93 F.2d at 664-65.
3 As the Second Circuit itself stated:
Compensation statutes are liberally construed. As the Supreme Court has
said, in Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408,
414: "Such [workers' compensation] laws operate to relieve persons
suffering ... [from workplace injury] of a part of the burden and to
distribute it to the industries and mediately to those served by them....
[These laws] are deemed to be in the public interest and should be
construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were
enacted and, if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results."
Id. at 665.
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supporting the separation of death benefits from decedent's rights.3'
2. Rights of Decedent
Although courts generally interpret workers' compensation death benefits
as property of surviving dependents, some jurisdictions have held that these
benefits attach to the resident alien decedent, and not to the nonresident alien
dependents. 32 Thus the benefits award is subject to clear federal constitutional protection, where the equal protection clause will be applied with strict
scrutiny.
In De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 33 the
decedent died as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred in the
course of his employment with a Florida company. The decedent had lived
and worked in the United States for over twenty-five years, providing
support for his wife and six minor children, all of whom were Mexican
residents and citizens. 4 The Florida workers' compensation statute, which
was almost identical to the present Georgia statute, limited death benefit
payments to foreigners to $1,000."5

31 See

A.O. Smith Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 485 N.E.2d at 335 (111. 1985) (holding that

the death benefit level should be determined at the higher rate in existence as of the time of
death, not the time of employee's injury nine years earlier); Sizemore v. State Workmen's
Compensation Comm'n, 219 S.E.2d at 912 (W. Va. 1975) (holding that an amendment to a
statute extending the payment of death benefits to an employee dying from injury from six
years after injury to ten years after injury applied, even though it was enacted after the
employee's original injury, since the death benefits are separate from the decedent's injury
rights).
32
See infra note 36 and accompanying text; Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669
(Kan. 1993).
'3 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989).
34id.
3' FLA. STAT. ch. 440.16 (1983). The statute provides:

compensation under this chapter to aliens not residents (or about to
become residents) of the United States or Canada shall be the same in
amount as provided for residents except that dependents in any foreign
country shall be limited to surviving spouse and child or children, or if
there be no surviving spouse or child or children, to surviving father or
mother whom the employee has supported, either wholly or in part, for
the period of 1 year prior to the date of the injury, and except that the
deputy commissioner may, at the deputy commissioner's option, or upon

the application of the insurance commissioner's option, or upon the
application of the insurance carrier, commute all future installments of
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The nonresident dependents challenged the statute. The Florida Supreme
Court found that the deceased worker's estate owned the rights to the
resulting death benefits under the statute. 6 According to the court, "[O]ne
of the primary benefits that an employee works for is the satisfaction and
well-being of providing for his or her family. ' 3 Thus, the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against resident aliens and their families, since the
decedent, as a resident alien, was protected under the Florida Constitution.38

D. Constitutionalityand Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
equal protection of the law. 39 Alienage has been construed as a suspect
classification under equal protection analysis.'
In order to withstand a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, state statutes which
discriminate on the basis of alienage must advance a compelling state interest
by the least restrictive means available.
However, whether nonresident aliens are entitled to the protection of the
United States Constitution is uncertain. Recently, the Kansas Supreme Court
struck down a death benefits statute similar to the Georgia provision.42 In
compensation to be paid to such aliens by paying or causing to be paid
to them one-half of the commuted amount of such future installments of
compensation as determined by the deputy commissioner, and provided
further that compensation to dependents referred to in this subsection shall
in no case exceed $1,000.
ld. Effective July 1, 1987, section 440.16(7) has been amended to provide a $50,000 cap on
death benefits to nonresident alien dependents other than Canadians. FLA. STAT. ch.
440.16(7) (1987).
' De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 206.
3 Id.
38 The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its
holding that the Florida Statute, to the extent it provided reduced benefits for Florida workers
with nonresident alien dependents not living in Canada, was unconstitutional.
39U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
40Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1971). "[Cllassifications based upon
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority
*..
for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." Id at 372-73.
' Id at 376; Bemal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
42 Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993).
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extending U.S. Constitutional rights to nonresident aliens, the court stated

that
Although the benefit limitation applies only to dependents
who are nonresident aliens, to suggest that this makes it a
classification based upon residence is disingenuous. Nonresident United States citizens are entitled to the same benefits
as resident citizens and resident aliens. The statute's
disparate treatment of these two classes of nonresidents is
solely based on alienage. Simply because the statute does
not similarly discriminate against resident aliens does not
make it any less an alienage classification... [the statute]
creates and treats differently a class of employees based on
the alienage of the employees' dependents; it is a legislative
classification based upon alienage.4 3
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has held that federal
constitutional rights arise from either citizenship or presence within the
territorial jurisdiction." A distinction is made for aliens who are residents;
they receive constitutional guarantees of equal protection because they are
subject to the laws of the jurisdiction and have protections commensurate
with their association with and obligations to the jurisdiction.4 5 The Equal
Protection Clause is construed as extending to persons "subject to the laws
of a State." For example, the Arizona Supreme Court has found that the
State Legislature's awarding of death benefits to nonresident dependents
potentially creates state constitutional rights for the dependents. It stated in
Jalifi v. Industrial Commission of Arizona that the "petitioner [dependent] is
conferred some benefits by the Arizona State Legislature, which may provide
the requisite nexus to bring her within the purview of the equal protection

Id. at 676.
4 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990). The Court held that
aliens who are not present within the territory of the United States simply do not have the
benefit of fundamental U.S. constitutional protections. Id.
'4 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 369 (1889); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971).
,6Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982).
41
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clause."47 Additionally, authority exists to support the view that nonresident aliens
subject to the laws of a state are entitled to equal protection
48
rights.

m. ANALYsIs
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision to uphold the Georgia statute
providing a $1,000 death benefit to nonresident, non-Canadian alien
beneficiaries implicates several important policy issues. First, are the basic
principles behind workers' compensation statutes advanced by the statute?
Secondly, what purpose is being served by the Georgia Supreme Court's
holding? Finally, what are the resulting effects of such a law on employment and workplace safety? Based on the analysis of these questions, it is
clear that the Georgia Supreme Court was incorrect in upholding code
section 34-9-265, in light of the discriminatory nature of provision (b)(5) of
the statute.
A. Vesting of Death Benefits
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the benefits due via workers'
compensation upon the death of an employee are property of the surviving
dependents, not the deceased employee.49 It based its decision on both
statutory language and case law precedent. 5° The Court found that the
legislature intended the rights to death benefits to vest in the dependents.5 '
The Court contrasted death benefits with sickness and burial expenses,
stating, "[T]he sickness and burial expenses are not like death benefits; they
are for the benefit of the decedent's estate. As such, these payments are a

"7644 P.2d 1319, 1321 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). Although the Arizona Supreme Court
eventually upheld the statutory limit on death benefits, it based its holding on the difficulties
of proof and administration arising because the dependents lived outside the United States.
Id. at 1322. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has well established that administrative
inconvenience does not survive the strict scrutiny standard awarded to equal protection cases
involving suspect classifications. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973). See
also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 19-20.
4 See, e.g., Alegria v. United States, 945 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1991).
49Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 429 S.E. 2d at 672.
50Id.

The Court stated, "Our analysis begins with an examination of the statute." Id.

"' id. at 673.
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property right of the decedent employee."52 The death benefits under
workers' compensation were held to be analogous to the right of recovery
under the wrongful death statute,53 a right which has been construed as
vested in the surviving family.'
The Georgia Supreme Court's view has been supported by other
jurisdictions.55 However, these cases can be distinguished from the present
case, since their holdings that death benefits are a property right of the
surviving dependents have generally resulted in a more favorable benefit for
the surviving dependents.56 Obviously, such was not the result for the
Morales family in Barge-Wagener. Additionally, the Barge-Wagenerholding
frustrates the general policy of affording employees the greatest possible
protection by liberally construing workers' compensation statutes.5 7
Furthermore, as noted by the dissent in Barge-Wagener, death benefits
under workers' compensation laws can reasonably be held to be rights
derived from the deceased worker.5 8 In finding the majority's analogy to
the wrongful death statute "fatally flawed," 59 the dissent stated that
[t]he benefits which flow from the workers' compensation
system are benefits afforded to the worker in exchange for
giving up the right to seek redress for injuries suffered on
the job.... One of the primary benefits that an employee

id.
" Id. at 672. For the text of Georgia's wrongful death statute, see GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4
52

(1993). Although based on an actionable tort upon the decedent, under the Georgia wrongful
death statute such an action is not a property right of the decedent's estate. See Boggan v.
Boggan, 243 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. App. 1978).
54Dixon v. Ross, 94 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. App. 1956).
5'See supra note 27.
5 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
" See De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 207. The Florida Supreme Court noted that this liberal
construction is no less applicable because "a worker's wife and children are aliens living some
place other than Canada." Id. at 207. Larson, a leading authority on death benefits, states,
"[Tihe dependent's right to death benefits is an independent right derived from statute, not
from the rights of the decedent." LARSON, supra note 19, at § 64.00. However, Larson's
interpretation results in greater protection for survivors' benefits: "Accordingly, death benefits
are not affected by compromises or releases executed by decedent, or by an adverse holding
on decedent's claim, or by claimant's failure to claim within the statutory period." Id. at §
64.00.
58 Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 429 S.E. 2d at 674 (Benham, J. dissenting).
" Id. at 674.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 24:397

works for is the satisfaction and well-being of providing for
his or her family .... We [the dissenting judges] do not
perceive this case as hinging on the constitutional rights of
the surviving dependents, but on the constitutional rights of
the worker, now deceased.... This case concerns whether
a worker who happens to have dependents residing out of
the country is entitled to the same fruits of his or her labor
as any other worker, including the same insurance benefits
where the state has required those benefits to be provided.
It thus is immaterial that petitioners happen to be nonresident aliens, since they have standing in this context as his
beneficiaries.'
Based upon the reasoning in contra holdings, as well as the general purpose
of workers' compensation laws, the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling is
' and "harsh",62
certainly "incongruous"61
as well as inherently unfair, in its
limitation of the Morales family's death benefit to $1,000.3 The severity
of the holding is not only inconsistent with cases such as International
Mercantile Marine Co., but in fact directly contravenes the spirit of those
decisions.
B. ConstitutionalIssue
If the death benefit rights under Georgia Code section 34-9-265(b)(5) are
perceived as belonging to the resident alien decedent, then the statute clearly
violates the equal protection guarantees of both the Georgia and United
States Constitutions.' Further, even if analyzed under the holding of the
Georgia Supreme Court that these death benefits belong to the surviving
dependents, there is still support for finding that the equal protection rights
of the Morales family were violated.

6'Id. at 675.
6'See supra note 30.
62id.
63 "I think it's the Dred Scott decision for the Hispanic community."
Comp Law
Discriminates, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting Atlanta lawyer John F. Sweet).
" The majority opinion in Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. conceded that the equal protection
clause extends to resident aliens. 429 S.E.2d at 673.
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The Georgia Supreme Court should have found that the protection of the
U.S. and Georgia Constitutions extends to the Morales family. Paralleling
the reasoning of the Arizona Supreme Court in Jalifi,6 the Morales family
has the requisite nexus with Georgia due to the $1,000 benefit conferred
upon them by the workers' compensation statute. The Moraleses, who have
foregone their rights under tort law by accepting what the Georgia Legislature provides under the Workers' Compensation Statute, are clearly "subject
to" the laws of Georgia. As such, they should be accorded the appropriate
constitutional rights in relation to the Georgia laws to which they are subject.
Under the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Pyler v. Doe,6 these rights
would include the right to equal protection of the laws, which the Georgia
workers' compensation statute clearly violates.
C. Public Policy Considerations
The discriminatory effects of Georgia Code section 34-9-265(b)(5) are
potentially devastating. The Florida Supreme Court in De Ayala found that
the existence of a similarly discriminatory statute could "conceivably
encourage some employers to selectively place aliens in the riskiest areas of
their businesses ... [since 1]iability to nonresident survivors would be
minimal if such a worker died."67 Similarly, the dissent in Barge-Wagener
found that
a likely result of the majority's holding in this case is that
employers may with impunity derive considerable savings
by skimping on safety precautions because it will be more
economical to hire Mexican nationals with nonresident
families for the most hazardous jobs, and let them die, than
it would be to institute proper safety procedures. Such a
result is totally at odds with the intent of the Workers'

Compensation Act. 68

These concerns are especially valid regarding alien workers in the United
States, many of whom have left their families behind in native countries in

6S 644

P.2d at 1319. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

457 U.S. at 202. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
543 So. 2d at 207, n.7.
68Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 429 S.E.2d at 676.
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dire economic situations. These workers are desperate for employment of
any kind, and often come to the United States with rudimentary English
language skills and lack even a basic understanding of the United States
judicial process in general and of workers' compensation in particular. As
a result, alien workers routinely place themselves in life-threatening work
situations, totally oblivious to the results should they be injured or die.69
Thus, policy concerns regarding workplace safety, as well as basic humanitarian concerns, demand that the discriminatory provision of Georgia's
Workers' Compensation Statute be struck down. As the dissent concluded
in Barge-Wagener, "[W]hile we are bound to uphold the laws, we are not
bound to do so without giving thought to matters of policy and justice,
neither of which would be served by creating a 'throw-away' class of
workers."7 °
IV. CONCLUSION

The provision of Georgia's Workers' Compensation Statute limiting death
benefits to nonresident, non-Canadian alien survivors of deceased workers
clearly discriminates based upon alienage and violates the equal protection
guarantees of both the Georgia Constitution and the United States Constitution. As such, it should be repealed as unconstitutional. Death benefits
under workers' compensation statutes were designed to provide a form of
social insurance for employees and their families. As a resident alien, Jose
Morales' protection and rights under the Georgia Constitution extended to
his nonresident alien family in regard to those benefits. Additionally, since
the benefits were statutorily derived, the Morales family was clearly subject
to the laws of Georgia and deserving of the protection of Georgia's laws,
including the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, public policy concerns
regarding workplace safety demand that Georgia Code section 34-9-265(b)(5)
be held unconstitutional.
Peter J. Diskin

69 See Roberto Suro, Immigrants Crowd Labor's Lowest Rung: Life on the Minimum
Wages Series, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1994, at Al.
70 Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 429 S.E.2d at 676.

